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I. INTRODUCTION
Many, many years ago, in 1973, I was invited to teach for a full
academic year at the University of South Carolina. A former
American colleague from the times when the going was good in
Ethiopia a few years earlier encouraged me to come to Columbia,
South Carolina, as the weather there would allow us to renew our
epic tennis games all year round! Having accepted the invitation,
*
Professor of Law Emeritus, Free University of Brussels and University
of Moncton (New Brunswick).
This paper was delivered as the 35th John H. Tucker , Jr. Lecture in Civil
Law, at the Louisiana State University Law Center (2008).
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the next point was to decide what to teach. Comparative law and
jurisprudence were the usual choices for foreigners untrained in the
common law. In addition to these obvious choices a course in
African political systems was suggested in the Faculty of Arts. As
it turned out, I respectfully submitted a proposal to teach a course
on the law of common lands in South Carolina. This was unusual,
as the topic was governed by state law and not usually taught at the
law school. But these were also the years when Professor Sax was
developing his ideas about public trust as a legal status for the
beaches on the Pacific coast in Oregon or Washington states. The
Faculty in Columbia kindly accepted my suggestion and I started
my exploration of the law on common lands; this was in fact my
first experience in the direct tackling of a common law topic and
also my first direct acquaintance with the case method I had
decided to use in class. And there came the surprise.
The more I was getting lost in the South Carolina Law Reports
of the 19th century, the more I was fascinated by the contents of
the law. I discovered that the State Supreme Court had indeed
formulated the doctrine of the public trust for common lands in the
early years of that century, but I was also puzzled by the scarcity of
references to cases in the decisions and the abundance of
quotations of Blackstone‟s and, later, Kent‟s classical
commentaries. These two authors, and also some less-known ones,
provided the starting-point of reasoning which appeared to me
much more deductive than inductive.
I made a note of it for a possible further study, but more than
thirty years went on without a chance of going any further in the
matter although my South Carolinian experience still lingered in
the back of my mind. In the course of these years I also developed
my familiarity with the common law and my liking for comparison
at the level of legal systems as a whole and for their taxonomy.1
Finally I am perfectly aware of the fact that even if that type of
exercise has gone out of fashion today, everyone still speaks of
legal systems belonging to different families of laws as something
self-evident.
Having reached the end of a half-a-century career as a law
teacher and not having much to lose, I accordingly decided to take
advantage of the great honour bestowed upon me by the Paul M.
Hebert Law Center in asking me to deliver the 35th Tucker
Lecture, to present in full the problem arising out in my view from

1.
See J. Vanderlinden, Religious Laws as Systems of Law: A
Comparatist’s View, in RELIGION, LAW AND TRADITION: COMPARATIVE STUDIES
IN RELIGIOUS LAW 165-182 (A. Huxley ed. 2002).
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of the practice of considering the pre-20th century American law
system as a common law system.
This, of course, requires a definition of the class “common law
system,” in which we envisage the classification of the
species “pre-20th century American law system.” There‟s the rub.
Of course, there‟s no place here for a theoretical discussion on the
“true” nature of a common law system, if there is one. Defining a
system is a risky task, but it has to be done if the language of the
law has to come out of the messy situation described by Karl
Llewellyn in The Bramble Bush.2 My own assumption is that there
are a few possibilities. The essential characters of the “pre-20th
century American legal system” may coincide with those of
the “common law system” and the question asked in the title of this
talk will be answered positively, or they won‟t and the only
solution, if we stick to the idea, will necessarily lead us to a
redefinition of what is common law system as a whole. Another
possibility is to consider that the American legal system is a
system sui generis which escapes classification, as obviously I
would not contemplate classifying it in the civil law systems. The
last possibility is to consider that such taxonomic game is not
worth playing and that not only my time, but also yours
unfortunately has been totally lost. If such is the case, please,
accept my most embarrassed apologies. Yet, allow me to take up
the challenge of defining the class, “common law system,” if only
for the sake of this essay.
The easiest way to characterize the common law is to use the
well-known expression “judge-made law,” which would however
not satisfy me fully as a person interested in comparison for two
reasons. One is that, contrary to the theory which pretends to
consider the judges‟ dicta as simple authorities and not “sources,”
the judges tend to play such a role in the production of the socalled “codified systems,” that the contents of the latter cannot be
satisfactorily apprehended on the face of the code sections and, in
many cases, require, in the most absolute manner, a maze of
statements produced by the courts in order to be properly
understood.3 Two is that English judges never miss an opportunity
to assert the pre-eminence of the legislator in the law-making
process and have as frequently repeated that if there was a gap in
the law it was not their duty to fill it, but that such task was
exclusively that of Parliament. Thus to give the impression that the
2.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 83 (Oceana 1978).
3.
J. Vanderlinden, The Law-Making Power of the Judiciary in French
Law, JURIDICAL REVIEW 1-20 (1967).
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common law is judge-made seems to be an oversimplification
which does not provide a satisfactory criterion in the comparison
of legal systems.
It is more useful to consider the steps followed by the English
judge in his production of the cornerstone of the system, the
precedent. If I am repeating it here, it is not to teach anything to
anyone in this audience, it is only to make my reasoning as clear as
possible. The English judge normally starts from facts brought to
his attention. He is careful to present them at the opening of his
judgment in the clearest and most possibly complete way; this is
also, possibly, an opportunity to reveal his true personality as Lord
Denning did so frequently and wonderfully in his opening
statements. Once the facts of the case are clear, the judge goes on a
search for previous decisions based on similar facts. Obviously he
will very rarely, if ever, find absolutely similar facts. Thus he will
have to decide upon the degree of satisfactory similarity existing
between the facts at hand and the facts in the previous case. Once
he is satisfied, he will look at the legal solution adopted in the
previous case and will apply it to the instant case. It is only at that
moment that the precedent is born; until then it is but a judgment in
a maze of decisions in which the judge has to sift out the best from
the worst, the technique of distinctions allowing him to navigate
through the impossible total similarity between factual situations.
In conclusion allow me to quote two famous authors located at
the beginning and the end of the long process of the history of the
common law. Henry de Bracton4 recommended to the lawyers of
his times to proceed “a similibus ad similia”, from the same facts
to the same solutions. Jeremy Bentham5 characterized the common
law as being an “ex post facto law.” These two terse formulas
encapsulate what I have just written as to the nature of the common
law. Let us turn now towards the late colonial and 19th century
United States. Consider five major periods: the period of colonial
America, the early post-independence period, the period preceding
the civil war and, finally, the period following it up to the reform
of legal education generally attributed to Langdell.
But, before entering the heart of the matter, let me express an
important caveat. Is one able to write any statement which is
globally valid for “the American colonies” as they progressively
take shape during the two centuries separating the late 16th from
the late 18th century and between what is now Maine down to
South Carolina? The diversity of the colonial settlements
4.
5.

Circa 1210-1268.
1748-1832.
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amalgamated in what is known in common parlance as British
North America is huge whether from a cultural, economic, political
or social point of view even if they have a common language and a
common origin. Envisaging the problem from the angle of the
legal historian is even more difficult due to the scarcity of the
readily available sources as to what the administration of law
effectively was in each colony or later, state. This fundamental
problem has not yet really frightened all those who have written
volumes about colonial America or the United States at large.
We‟ll meet in this short and necessarily summary presentation an
example in the field of reactions towards Loyalists after
independence of how the situation in one state, in the case
Maryland, can radically differ from what is assumed to be a
“national” situation. Nevertheless I‟ll follow the example of my
colleagues who assume that one can generalize some conclusions
at the level of the United States, while being fully aware of the
high relativity of whatever I write under such heading. This had to
be said before venturing in this brief presentation.
II. THE COLONIAL PERIOD
There are many ways through which the English common law
came into the American colonies. The earliest and most common
was the so-called birthright implying that every settler carried at
his shoe soles the law under which he was born. One often quotes
in that respect the article of James the First‟s Charter of Virginia,
1606 which runs as follows:
Also we do, for Us, our Heirs, and Successors, DECLARE,
by these Presents, that all and every the Persons being our
Subjects, which shall dwell and inhabit within every or any
of the said several Colonies and Plantations, and every of
their children, which shall happen to be born within any of
the Limits and Precincts of the said several Colonies and
Plantations, shall HAVE and enjoy all Liberties,
Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other
Dominions, to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been
abiding and born, within this our Realm of England, or any
other of our said Dominions.6
Obviously the text doesn‟t refer to the common law as such,
but rather to the “Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities” of all
English subjects of the Crown. But that general statement is often
6.
Available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/va01.htm
(last visited April 21, 2011).
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supplemented by provisions in the charters given to colonies and
referring to the application of English Law or, at least, to a law,
either imported or established locally, being “as near as may be” to
the laws of England.7
If our perspective is narrower, what we must look for are court
decisions which stand at the very beginning of a possible inductive
process towards precedent. There‟s the rub. What we are looking
for is what Sir John Holt, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales
between 1689 and 1710, described as: “these scrambling reports
[which] will make us to appear to posterity for a parcel of
blockheads.”8 Not only are they scrambling but also they are
numerous. A quick and quite summary count of the pages included
in the 120 volumes or so of law reports published in England prior
to 1776 comes up to a total of many tens of thousands pages of
which no common index existed. There were not many lawyers in
colonial America who could afford such a collection outside the
main economic or political centers of the Northeast.
Law schools or law libraries did not exist at that time and
everyone wishing to go into the business of law had to master his
own documentary resources. The happy few, some 150 of them,9
who went to England were perhaps better placed as originating
from reasonably affluent (and influent) families, but these were the
exception.
The example of the resources available to John Adams, future
vice-president and president of the United States, when he was
articling is well known and fairly documented through his diary.10
Among all sorts of books, he successively reads Justinian‟s
Institutes (in Latin), Gilbert‟s Tenures (at night), Wood, two
7.
For example, in the charter of the same Queen to Sir Walter Raleigh
which reads when dealing with the latter‟s legislative power: “So always as the
said statutes, lawes, and ordinances may be as neere as conveniently may be,
agreeable to the forme of the lawes, statutes, governement, or pollicie of
England”, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/16th_century/raleigh.asp (last
visited April 21, 2011); see also BARNES T.G., “As Near as May be Agreeable
to the Laws of this Kingdom:” Legal Birthright and Legal Baggage at Chebucto,
1749, in LAW IN A COLONIAL SOCIETY: THE NOVA SCOTIA EXPERIENCE (Waite
et al. eds. 1984).
8.
Slater v. May, 2 Ld. Raym 1072.
9.
CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 188-189
(1911).
10. See John Adams, Experiences as a Law Student, 1758, in 1 THE
HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND
PRIMARY SOURCES, 93-106 (Steve Sheppard ed. 1999); see also, Daniel R.
Coquillette, Justinian in Braintree: John Adams, Civilian Learning and Legal
Elitism 1758-1775, in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES 75-92 (Steve Sheppard ed.
1999). This volume includes similar testimonies by two other famous lawyers,
John Marshall and James Kent.
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volumes of both Coke‟s Reports and John Lilly‟s Practical
Register or General Abridgment of the Law (1719), Hawkins‟
Pleas of the Crown, and Fortescue; he also recites aloud Cicero‟s
discourses against Catilina to improve his pulmonary capacity and
speaking abilities. When he comes back to Boston, his first reading
is, again, Justinian‟s Institutes with the hope of gaining the support
of two veteran lawyers from the local bar. The reports are not
much in the picture.
But, had they been on the shelves, finding the cases of which
the facts were similar to those you had to deal with was another
nearly insuperable challenge. It may accordingly be assumed that
their current use at the level of practitioners outside these main
centers was minimal and excluded.
Thus many people who wanted to become acquainted with the
common law would certainly have been inclined to follow the
advice to his nephew of another respected judge of these times,11
Lord Thomas Reeve, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (17361737) encouraged him at the beginning of his legal career12 to only
tackle the Law Reports after having perused and mastered Thomas
Wood‟s Institutes,13 Jacob‟s Dictionary,14 Littleton‟s Tenures, and
An abridgment of the first part of my Ld. Coke's Institutes by
William Hawkins! Obviously, there was not yet any idea of a case
method.
This does not mean that where precedents were available,
lawyers would not respect them. But they were not conceived as
the starting point of a deductive process. They were only there to
allow a discovery of what the common law was through their
rationale.
Thus most lawyers of these times, especially in what was then
the south of the country, e.g. the Carolinas, would rather or had to
(if only by the lack of English reports) rely upon a short practical
presentation of the law of the kind cited in the last paragraph. In
that respect, the real turning point is the publication in England,
then in the United States of Blackstone‟s Commentaries published
in four volumes between 1765 and 1769 at the Cambridge
University Press; to Blackstone I‟ll come back in the following act.

11. 1 HARGRAVE F., COLLECTANEA JURIDICA 79-81(1791).
12. The letter was also given to be read by the first lawyer who accepted
to take John Adams as an apprentice in Boston. See supra note 8, at 100.
13. Who also appears in the readings of John Adams.
14. References to this apparently well-known dictionary in his time are
also found in the first judgments of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, the first
one established by a British Government in what was still the colony of Nova
Scotia, long before Canada was created in 1867.
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But what about the knowledge and use of the common law in the
meantime?
The impression which prevails is that we are confronted with
what I would call on the one hand a “folk” knowledge of the law at
large by non-lawyers and on the other hand a very indirect
knowledge of an embryonic legal profession through the use of
works like Wood‟s Institutions at the best from a scholarly point of
view and like those of Jacob‟s New Law Dictionary at the best
from a practitioner‟s one. Wood‟s is, in many respects a pioneer
and an ardent supporter of the common law from whom
Blackstone must have drawn much inspiration and Jacob‟s New
Law Dictionary, published in 1729, reached five editions before
1744 and was continued by T. E, Tomlins, who published its first
American edition in six volumes in 1811 under the title The Law
Dictionary. Whether one looks at the educated public or at the
lawyer, the approach to the common law is essentially practical in
everyday life.
Behind this earthly concern was a solid cultural background of
basic principles about what justice should be in accordance with
deep religious feelings. They included not only the law of God, but
also “principles, that are permanent, uniform and universal.”15
Hence a fundamentally deductive approach going from the top,
God, to the subject of the Crown in his daily activities. A high
respect for what law should be in such surroundings certainly
trumped technicalities and the doctrine of precedent (assuming it
did exist at that time and is not a projection in history of more
recent doctrines). One looked for the law in a diffuse corpus of
Godly natural law or of reason, the lay face of which we profusely
find in the English cases of the time.16 If they could support
through a quotation or another a common cultural and obvious
doctrine, thus making it “legal,” so much the better. The result was
a narrow conception to the judge‟s role. He was, as one often says,
a “discoverer” of a common law which fitted with his cultural
background. His task was not to innovate or create law and he
accordingly most willingly practised a strict doctrine of stare
decisis.17
Quite different was the frontier lawyer. The concept of frontier
itself is not altogether well defined, but let us consider that it
15. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 7 (1992).
16. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., Judicial Precedent in the Late Eighteenth and
Early Nineteenth Centuries: A Commentary on Chancellor Kent’s
Commentaries, (2006) University of St. Thomas School of Law, Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 06-28, specially at 16-27.
17. HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 8-9.
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encompasses the territories on the western edge of the 13 colonies
where progressively settlers established themselves before its parts
progressively obtain the status of territory, followed by that of state
in the Union at the very end of the 18th and the early 19th century;
that first frontier will give birth to States like Alabama, Missouri,
Ohio, or Tennessee.18 From then on the frontier would carry on its
progressive march westwards. As for the Frontier or Pioneer
(Adventurer in the sense of the Merchant Adventurer of the 15th
century and later would be an as good or even better qualification)
lawyer.19 The generally young man with a fairly recent legal
baggage acquired by articling or passing through one of the early
law schools, one can easily imagine that his luggage strapped near
his saddle would not leave much room for many books, even of the
size of Jacob‟s Dictionary or—but this was much heavier—
Blackstone. The Bible (indispensable to administer oaths or be
read in the last minutes before the hanging of a murderer among
other things) was more likely to be in the bags in front of or behind
his saddle.
III. FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY
The period around the Declaration of Independence by the
American colonies in 1776 and the 1820‟s opened up from the
point of view of the production of law with five major events
which may be seen as somewhat linked together by a common
starting point: the Declaration of Independence itself and its legal
form, the Articles of Confederation, followed by the Constitution
of the United States. Centering on these fundamental texts, let us
only mention these five major events: in chronological order, 1)
the adoption of constitutional texts; 2) the departure from the legal
scene of many prominent lawyers of the times; 3) the increased
lack of law reports; 4) the rise of major treaties; and 5) the creation
of the first law schools.
A. The Adoption of Constitutions
I am not going to elaborate on this, but let me just remind the
reader of the importance, from the point of view of the formal
sources of law, of the appearance of a text encompassing all the
fundamental features of the structure of the State. It was of course
known in the English legal history since the passing of the
18.
19.

In alphabetical not chronological order.
See, e.g. WILLIAM FRANCIS ENGLISH, THE PIONEER LAWYER AND
JURIST IN MISSOURI XXI 2 (1947).
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Instrument of Government of 1653, but had been deliberately
wiped off from memory as unconstitutional and thus, altogether
with all the laws of the Commonwealth, sent back to the limbos of
non-existence. Whatever “legal” had taken place during a period of
some fifteen years was replaced by the first “legal” years of the
reign in absentia of Charles II in exile in the Netherlands.20 From
then on and until today, England (and later the United Kingdoms)
never felt the need for a single constitutional document, although
its constitution is far from being totally unwritten.
On the contrary, as from the Articles of Confederation the
United States (and, in the immediately following years, their
thirteen members) were living under a basic legal document. Even
if at the beginning it did not matter much for the current
adjudication of litigation between common citizens, it laid next to
the principles of justice and natural law inherited from colonial
times as another term of reference when starting the quest for law.
That is, as a document where one would find some principle from
which to deduct a possible solution to a legal problem.
B. The Departure from the Legal Scene of Many Prominent
Lawyers
One of the first results of the American Revolution was the
Loyalist diaspora which, for example, led to Canada between forty
and fifty thousand British subjects who were faithful to the Crown.
Among them were many lawyers of whose the exact number seems
unknown although they have recently attracted more interest,
especially insofar Nova Scotia is concerned.21 Among those who
remained many went into politics or the judiciary at a high level.
The names of Adams, Kent and Marshall, each in its own sphere,
the State, and/or the Judiciary, have become the most glaring
examples of that phenomenon. But it is likely that these are the
trees concealing the forest. Finally, many Loyalists who had
reached a respectable status in the profession and could or would
not migrate for various reasons preferred retirement to the risk of
being disbarred for their political opinions. Some of them
depending on where they resided, were effectively expelled from
the bar, but this attitude was far from making unanimity. Major
20. The first acts passed by Parliament after the return of Charles II in
1660 were numbered 12 Charles II.
21. See, among others, the recent article, Jim Phillips, The Court and the
Legal Profession: Loyalist Lawyers and the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, 1785–
1790, The Promise and Perils of Law: Lawyers in Canadian History (Wesley
Pue & Backhouse eds. 2009); see also www.loyalistresearchnet.org (last visited
April 21, 2011).
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figures, like Alexander Hamilton took a clear stand against it and
he was not alone in his stand. As a result, for some authors,
independence “wrought havoc upon the American legal
profession;” this quantity-wise, the quality-wise approach being as
strong under the pen E. Griswold, “There is no doubt that this was
a serious set-back to the overall calibre of the profession in
America.”22 Such statements, which are common saying among the
most prominent legal historians of the period, must be taken with
caution, as Nolan has quite convincingly demonstrated by showing
how different the situation was in Maryland.23 One thing, however,
may be accepted: training for the bar through apprenticeship
became more difficult, which does not mean that it disappeared.
C. The Increased Lack of Law Reports
We have seen that in the previous period referring to cases was
not an easy task for various reasons. The quasi-permanent conflict
with Britain until the end of 1814 just accentuated the problem.
Not only would English reports arrive with more difficulties, but
the revolutionary spirit was prone to reject English law as such, it
being one of the symbols of previous oppression. As for local
reports it took some fifteen years for the first ones to appear in
many states and one could not expect decided cases by the
supreme or appeal courts to immediately cover the whole field of
law. As Kent wrote at the end of the century, “one never dreamed
of volumes of reports and written opinions.”24 Thus the ground
was not yet ready for the development of a possible inductive
approach.
D. The Rise of Treatises
Five years before independence was proclaimed and two years
after the publication of its last volume by the Cambridge
University Press, William Blackstone‟s four volumes of his
Commentaries were published in Philadelphia and had an
immediate success in the United States: 1400 copies were rapidly
sold, supplemented by 2500 before 1776. Very quickly, Wood and
Jacob were forgotten. Here, at last, a handy (four in eight volumes,
instead of the similar folios of Wood) and systematic (as we have
22. The two quotations are in the seminal paper Dennis R. Nolan, The
Effect of the Revolution on the Bar: the Maryland Experience, 62 VA. L. REV.
969 (1976).
23. Id.
24. See James B. Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at the
Universities, 9 HARV. L. REV. 169, 170 (1895) (quoting Kent).
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seen the plan of Justinian‟s Institutes, which Blackstone follows,
was familiar to colonial lawyers) description of the common law
was available. No wonder that the frequency of the references to
the Commentaries had so quickly struck me when ventured for the
first time in the South Carolina law reports many, many years ago.
There is no need to elaborate on that success story which appears
in all text-books about early American legal history. Blackstone
was not only a source for judges. It also struck young men either
articling or studying in one of the early law schools, or even some
of them temporarily lost in the countryside because of the War of
Independence.25 As Nolan quite convincingly showed, his
influence was “more indirect and far more diffuse, but no less
significant, than is usually claimed.”26
But Blackstone presented a major problem as of 1776. The
public law part of his work was pure blasphemy in the Republic.
There was also a point here and there where the clause “as near as
may be” had transformed English common law in American
common law. No wonder thus that “annotated” versions of the
Commentaries appeared rapidly, the best known being that of StJohn Tucker published in 1803. Interestingly enough the notes
updated Blackstone in accordance with the American constitution
and laws, but also with the same of the Commonwealth of
Virginia.
If Blackstone‟s work played a fundamental role in the shaping
of American legal minds—one must not undervalue from our point
of view, the influence of the many specific treatises—at first
directly imported from England or locally republished and later on
more or less adapted to the local law. To cite two examples, in the
first group we find some standard textbooks like Gilbert‟s Law of
Evidence, and in the second one, Chitty‟s A Treatise on the Bills of
Exchange.27
E. The Creation of the First Law Schools
Legal education in the common law as it was practiced in the
colonies was not organized on a collective basis before
independence. It appeared in Connecticut in 1784 in the town of
Litchfield and was an initiative of a practitioner of high local
25. Id. at 170, still quoting Kent discovering “with awe” the
Commentaries and “reading them again and again” in his later life.
26. Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American
Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y. U. L. REV. 731, 767 (1976);
Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
27. Quite interesting in that respect is A.W. Brian Simpson, The Rise and
Fall of the Treatise, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 668-671 (1981).
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reputation, Tapping Reeve. It lasted for nearly fifty years and
trained a thousand or so lawyers among whom many achieved a
reputation in the legal profession and beyond it.28
For the first time, the definitely erratic articling system which
is reflected in some diaries like the one of John Adams gave place
to a systematic overview of the law spread on two years at the rate
of a lecture a day delivered in the morning by Reeve or, later, by
his associate John Gould. Afternoons were spent at questioning
teachers, discussions between students and reading books or cases
in the school small library which was also its only classroom
located next to Reeve‟s house. Weekly examinations and moot
courts also prepared the students for a career at the bar. The focus
in the lectures was on principles corroborated by references to
authors (Blackstone was prominent among them) or cases.
The impact of the school on American law can be appreciated
by the careers of its graduates who came from all around the
United States: three became Supreme Court Justices and thirty-four
sat on state supreme courts, while scores of them became lower
court judges or law professors. Finally, looked at from our point of
view, it was very much in the traditional pre-independence
approach of looking for or at principles when confronted with a
case and buttressing the deducted solution by a reference to books
of authority.
The case of small professional law schools like Lichtfield is not
unique,29 but other forms of formal legal education appeared
during the period. They range from the setting up of a course of
law in an Arts Faculty, the appointment of a professor of law or the
beginnings of institutions such as Yale or Harvard Law Schools.
Some of these ventures, including a first try at Harvard, aborted
more or less rapidly. But they all shared a similar deductive
approach when dealing with the production of legal solutions: from
the facts of the case directly up to the principle and from the
principle down to the solution of the case.
IV. FROM EARLY-19TH CENTURY TO LANGDELL
From our point of view, three points emerge from the halfcentury or so which separates the definitive independence of the
United States from Britain at the end of the Anglo-American War
28. See Andrew M. Siegel, To Learn and Make Respectable Hereafter:
The Litchfield Law School in Cultural Context, N. Y. U. L. REV. 1978 (1998).
29. See ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE
LAW 132-150 (The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
1921).
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from the appointment of Christopher Columbus Langdell as
professor at Harvard: 1) professional lawyers take control of the
production of the common law; 2) specific treatises flourish; and 3)
formalism prevails.
A. Professional Lawyers Take Control of the Production of the
Common Law
If no real change appears in principle in the way of producing
the law, something different but fundamental resulted from the
change in legal education which characterizes the previous period.
A class of professional lawyers was born endowed with a similar
way of dealing with legal problems in times of deep changes in the
cultural, economic, political and social features of American
society. That class of lawyers was to provide to these changing
times not only the legal superstructure and judiciary it needed, but
also a good deal of its political elites. And when the latter would,
in their view, default at the legislative or executive levels, the
activism of the former would be there to supplement their
shortcomings. Such approach was needed. Changing circumstances
which characterize the first half of the 19th century required legal
solutions which Blackstone could not necessarily provide. Or, if he
could, at least come reinterpretation was needed in order to tackle
these new challenges. This was an intense period of legal activity
which shaped American law. It was based, like previous ones, on
new credos which in turn were formulated in legal terms by the
judiciary.
As Horwitz writes, “[w]hat dramatically distinguished
nineteenth century law from its eighteenth century counterpart was
the extent to which common law judges came to play a central role
in directing the course of social change.”30 Horwitz considers quite
validly that judges have taken the place of the legislator by
“establishing rules of very general application.”31 These rules were
equivalent to legislation and became the basic term of reference
towards which one would turn to solve legal problems. Thus the
judge begins to consider himself as a legislator, someone who
provides “remedies according to the growing wants, and varying
circumstances of men …”32

30.
31.
32.

HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 23.
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B. The Triumph of Formalism
Once the transformation was achieved, the judiciary took up
the task of buttressing the new legal framework he has contributed
to create for the advantage of “men.” Horwitz‟s phrase has to be
completed by defining which men he refers to. The answer comes
some two hundred pages later in his book. The beneficiaries of
judicial activism are the ones who hold “political and economic
power,” the “merchant and entrepreneurial groups” who manage
“to forge an alliance with the legal profession.” One thinks
irresistibly of what happened during the Tudor period in England
when, in the 16th century, merchants, parliamentarians and
lawyers joined in a ruling cultural, economic, political and social
class. In the United States, the legal tool used for the purpose was
formalism. The growing wants and varying circumstances of a
class of men were satisfied and the resulting legal system took the
new dimension of being self-evident and rational, thus completely
objective and detached from the state of the Union. And so were,
in principle, its fundamental values which, from then on, supported
its development through interpretation. The latter became highly
“rational” and “formal.”
In such framework, arguments of “justice,” “morality,” and
“equity” were preposterous, and the latter, considered as a distinct
mode of production of law would rapidly disappear being merged
into the common law. They were replaced by a “scientific”
approach to law, which was reflected in the treatise literature as we
shall see. Such an approach implied a deductive method where
solutions inexorably flow from pre-existing principles.
C. The Flourishing of Treatises
As we have seen specific treatises directly inspired from
English law were known and used in the previous period alongside
with major works offering an overall view of the same. We also
had a glimpse at the progressive americanization of these doctrinal
contributions. Thus the time had come for genuine American
specific treatises. The first step, very much in the line of the
previous period, was the publication of Kent‟s Commentaries
during the years 1826 to 1830. Then followed more specific
writers: The most prolific of these was Joseph Story, Justice of the
Supreme Court since 1811 and concurrently Dane Professor of
Law at Harvard since 1829. In thirteen years, he published nine
major treatises. From then on, treatises were part of the American
legal landscape. From our point of view, they did not encourage a
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deductive approach in the production of the common law. In spite
of a growing load of State case law. It was not used much when
confronted with concrete problems in order to launch an inductive
process.
The apex of that doctrine characterizing the treatise tradition of
the pre-civil war period which concentrated on the principles from
which solutions were deduced is perhaps best described by
William W. Story, a son of the previous one, in his A Treatise on
the Law of Contracts not under Seal:33 1) principles come before
cases; 2) cases, even the most interesting ones, are purely
illustrative of the principle; 3) accordingly the place of cases is in
the footnotes. Such a description would perfectly fit (but for the
replacement of principles by articles of a code) any French treatise
of the same period. This approach of law resulted of a strong belief
in the “scientific” character of law and the correlated idea that the
objective of any science was the discovery of fundamental
principles from which the practitioner would deduct logical step by
logical step a solution to the concrete problem he was confronted
with in daily life. Thus principles established by the science of law
would replace those which, in the previous period, came from God
or non-religious natural law.34
***
During that period, Louisiana constitutes a well-known
exception on which there is no need for me to expand in front of
auditors or readers of whom I am only a most grateful and humble
guest. Louisiana stands at the confluent of three legal traditions
which have their own laws even if two of them belong to the same
“family;” it explains its qualification as a “mixed” system on
which I‟ll come back in my conclusion.35 The contributions of
Spanish and French law and lawyers to the development of
Louisiana‟s legal system are well-known.36 Blackstone and his
commentaries (or his followers) were nevertheless not completely
absent from the picture. There are good reasons to this as much of
Louisiana‟s law is indeed common law. Thus, no wonder that if

33. WILLIAM W.
UNDER SEAL (1844).

STORY A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT

34. Simpson, supra note 27, at 671-672.
35. On this evolution which has given rise to a huge amount of literature,
see, for example, volume 63, issue 4, of the University of Chicago Law Review
(2003).
36. See, among so many others, the contribution of one of my
predecessor in the Tucker Lectures, Professor Robert A. Pascal, Of the Civil
Code and Us, 59 LA. L.REV. 301 (1998).
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one looks at cases from the State Supreme Court between 1809 and
1834, one finds some 30 references to Blackstone, but also 39 to
Kent‟s Commentaries, or other specific treatises written by wellknown English jurists supplementing the Code provisions.
V. THE TIMES OF LANGDELL
(THE LAST QUARTER OF THE 19TH CENTURY)
Some ten years, after Christopher C. Langdell was appointed
Dane Professor of Law at Harvard University, Holmes reacted in
his The Common Law against what Horwitz characterizes as the
development by judges and jurists of “a small group of
fundamental conceptions—fault, will, property rights—from which
one could logically deduce virtually all legal rules and doctrines.”37
If one accepts that perception of the common law at the origins of
our last act, there is no doubt that the assumption that American
law is founded on an inductive method progressing from case to
case towards a formulation of what law is in a specific case was
still highly challengeable when Langdell enters the stage at our
fourth and last act.
Langdell shares the belief of his contemporaries that law is a
science and that accordingly the task of scholars is the discovery of
the principles governing its object, i.e. the law.38 There is however
a reaction on Langdell‟s part which is twofold: 1) the number and
volume of the law reports in which the principles were to be found
became difficult to master by the students and 2) that intellectually
the re-discovery of the principle by the student through the study
of the judge‟s reasoning was educationally more fruitful than the
reading and memorization of what the treatise said. As Langdell
himself put it: “The object of the case system is to compel the
mind to work out the principles from the cases.”39 Complementary
to that statement, came the fact that, in the mass of the decisions,
only the “leading cases” had to be studied and studied in depth.
The direct result for the teacher was his responsibility to provide
classes with casebooks in which the student could find the path (or
the successive stages) which led to a principle.
The question, from our point of view is: Has Langdell, through
the establishment of a method of legal education (the presently
everywhere practiced in the common law world case-method)
37. HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 129.
38. Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid Jr., The Transformation of
English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L. J. 438, 513-514
(1996).
39. Cited in The Increasing Influence of the Langdell Case System of
Instruction., 5 HARV. L. REV. 89 (1891).
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brought a fundamental change in the way the common law is
produced? In other words has the production of the law by
American judges become inductive?
I am in no position or ability even to risk an assessment of
Langdell‟s contribution to a possible change in the nature of
American law as a common law system; some of my most
distinguished colleagues have been tempted by the challenge,40 but
again I have neither the wish nor the means to support or not their
conclusions. Let me only mention them in their essentials.
Horwitz, speaking of the structure of legal reasoning in the period
1870-1905, refers to the “[d]eduction from general principles and
analogies among cases and doctrines” which he sees as “the
crystallisation of a „legalistic‟ mindset” which, as we have seen,
had emerged in the previous half-century. In a totally apparently
contradicting way, Kimball speaks of Langdell‟s “inductive
approach” which differs so much from the previous ones.41
Kimball insists on that character of Langdell‟s approach in the
discovery of principles, but, once they are established, he admits
that it turns deductive in the application of principles to facts. Thus
it appears that pre-existing principles still govern the production of
the law.
In spite of the impossibility for me to propose a clear-cut
answer to the question of Langdell‟s position and before
concluding this presentation, I would like to offer a few personal
remarks on the subject. Assuming that Langdell‟s supporters are
right, his induction process seems to focus on extracting principles
from the solutions offered by the courts; hence the need of a
careful study of case-law; hence the case method while training
lawyers. While fully supporting that method—which I have been
applying to my teachings ever since I got familiar with it in South
Carolina—I would only most carefully and humbly suggest that
this is not starting from the facts, looking for similar facts, then for
the legal solution resulting from the latter and finally applying it
with possible distinctions to the pending case thus erecting the
previous one to the status of precedent. Mutatis mutandis
Langdell‟s inductive approach appears to me nearer to that of Lord
Atkin in Donoghue when he suggests a quest for the general
principles of tort law as they can be found in the existing cases.
But as much as I am willing to admit that my reading of Langdell
40. See, e.g. HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 16-17; Bruce A. Kimball,
Langdell on Contracts & Legal Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian
Caricature, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 345 (2007); see also Berman & Reid, supra
note 38, at 513-515.
41. Id. at 349.
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is erring, I am also willing to admit that I am misreading Lord
Atkin.
VI. CONCLUSION
What American practitioners and scholars developed during
the 19th century can be characterized by many features of the
“classical” common law system as it was born and grew up in
totally different surroundings in England during some five or six
(my starting point is either Henry the First or Henry the Second)
centuries or so until the eve of the American Revolution. There is
no doubt that one may say that what followed in the two countries
was a “judge-made” system of law, even if there can be differences
in the meaning of the adjective on both sides of the Atlantic and
also some general reservations as to its inapplicability to civil law
systems.42
One may also maintain the opinion that preceding cases play an
important, if not fundamental, role in the solution the judge will
build up when confronted with the facts of a case. But, if one refers
then to “precedent,” things change radically. The English
precedent is indeed fundamental. So are facts. The American
precedent is quite different, as it appears ancillary to the principles
while the English lawyer is reluctant to refer to principles possibly
deducted from precedents. Nothing is further away from facts than
principle. This difference cannot be ignored as the latter inevitably
provides a starting point for a deductive process while the latter
remains deeply rooted in induction. And, for reasons which I
believe I have shown to be obvious, the American system has
developed around principles.
Now, all this relies on a choice made by the outside observer as
to which factors matter in the definition of systems or families of
laws and, of course, on the validity or even interest of taxonomy in
its application to social phenomena. It could very well be that the
latter are totally impervious to such approach. Or that the latter is
totally out of fashion if not preposterous. I am most willing to
accept all these.
The introduction of taxonomy in the field of legal systems is
fairly recent; it dates back to the beginning of the previous century
when the comparison of legal systems took a new start. Since then
the taxonomy has developed and various combinations of some 19
criteria were proposed as a basis for the classification of legal
systems. Among these, one found all sorts of possible
42.

See Vanderlinden, supra note 3.
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characteristic of laws or legal systems: their conceptual apparatus,
their stage of development, the place they gave to fundamental
rights, their dynamism, the hierarchy of their formal sources, their
history, their economic, political or social ideology, their
characteristic institutions, the development of their legal language,
their way of thinking the law, their methods of interpretation, their
way of reason, the number of people they governed, the place they
left to religion, the race of the people they governed, their
economic system, the role of the lawyers in their development,
their material sources and, finally, their structures. Among all
these, the specialists would combine a number of them ranging
from one to seven.
As for the “families” accordingly constituted there were 20. In
most cases, reference was made to a geographical area: Africa,
Africa and Asia, Europe and America, the Far-East, Nordic
countries, Western countries, and Scandinavia. Culture was
involved when referring to religious laws or one of them,
specifically Islamic law or languages when speaking of Slavonic
laws. Then came an economic reference with the Socialist laws;
oddly enough no one ever referred to a family of capitalist laws!
There were also some odd families, like the Classical Antiquity
one, that of the “civilized” laws which was easily opposed to the
family of “primitive” laws, or, finally, that of the “other laws”
regrouping all laws which would not fit into the other ones! As for
the last four, they were, at last, referring to laws (or legal
traditions): the common law family, the Germanic laws family, the
Romanist laws family, and a combination of the last two, the
Romano-Germanic legal family.
Such taxonomies did not make much sense. Finally the most
often mentioned were the common law, Islamic law, romanogermanic and socialist families, but quite frequently selected on a
different mixture of characteristics. This also was, in my view, not
satisfying. If we bring laws together in “families,” there must be
some logic in the selection justifying this or that grouping. The
logical inescapable conclusion of such process is that every single
potential member of a family must satisfy the requirements set
down for entering the family as defined in its characterization. If it
doesn‟t, it has to find another family or build a family of its own.
Or we have to change the requirements asked for entering the
family, thus its essential features. This is the choice I believe we
are confronted with when looking for a family for the 19th century
American legal system.
Thus, either the latter meets the requirement of a so-called
common law family, including that fundamental one which is the
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inductive method of law producing. Or it does not, which is what I
tend to believe having read my fellow legal historians specializing
in American legal history. Or, if we absolutely want to include
American law in the common law systems, we have to exclude the
inductive method from the essential characteristics of a common
law system, which I am not willing to do when reading my fellow
legal theorists of the English legal system which I still consider to
be the archetype of common law systems.
Perhaps is it also true that logic itself is not any more part of
the grid we are tempted to apply to social phenomena. We live in a
time of disorder not of order, of irrationality not of rationality. It
could very well be that if we look at the producers, forms, contents
and processes characteristic of every law, each of them will appear
as a mixed system—would I dare to say a bastard as it would have
no real family. What we are contemplating today is, nearly
everywhere, a complex ever-moving thoroughfare of producers,
forms, contents and processes fighting and fertilizing one another.
If this is the case, I would be completely satisfied. Being myself
convinced, as a radical legal pluralist, that, in many cases if not
most of them, law is but what every individual claims it is, I would
appear so much contradicting myself when pleading for taxonomy,
that I feel it much better to stop here before making a complete
fool of myself.
Here cracks a noble scientific process
Good night sweet taxonomy
And flights of angels sing thee to thy rest.43
Baton Rouge, May 16 2008Brussels, March 10 2011

43. I hope the bard of Stratford-upon-Avon will forgive me this free
adaptation of the closing sentence of his Hamlet.

